

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 DRC-01 /164 W

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P R 221951Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY686

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 9655

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PRELIMINARY COMMENTS OF SOVIET REP ON OUT  
LINE PROPOSALS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN RESPONSE TO SUGGESTION BY AD  
HOC GROUP TO DO SO AS RETURN GESTURE FOR ADVANCE  
NOTICE BY SOVIETS OF THEIR PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 8,  
US REP PRESENTED ADVANCE SUMMARY OF ALLIED OUTLINE  
PROPOSALS TO SOVIET REP (HLESTOV) AND SOVIET DEPREP  
(SMIRNOVSKY) ON THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 21. SOVIET REP  
EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR COURTESY. IN HIS BRIEF  
COMMENT, HE STRESSED THAT USSR PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT  
WERE STRONGLY INTERESTED IN REDUCTION OF BUNDESWEHR  
AND THAT VAGURE PROMISE OF SECOND PHASE COVERING

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BUNDESWEHR WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT . SOVIET GOVERNMENT

AND PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT TOLERATE SOVIET REDUCTIONS  
UNLESS BUNDESWEHR WERE REDUCED SIMULTANEOUSLY.  
SOVIET REP ASKED IF IN ALLIED APPROACH FIRST  
PHASE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY  
AFTER SIGNING. END SUMMARY.

2. IN RESPONSE TO SUGGESTION OF AD HOC GROUP IN ITS  
MEETING NOVEMBER 21 TO GIVE SOVIET DEL ADVANCE IN-  
FORMATION OF ALLIED OUTLINE PROPOSALS TO BE  
DELIVERED AT NOVEMBER 22 PLENARY AS GESTURE TO MAINTAIN  
ATMOSPHERE IN RETURN FOR SOVIET ADVANCE NOTICE  
TO ALLIES ON THEIR NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL, US REP INVITED  
SOVIET REP AND SOVIET DEPREP TO US DELEGATION OFFICE  
EVENING OF NOVEMBER 21.

3. US REP POINTED OUT THAT ALLIES HAD ADHERED TO  
A POLICY OF BUSINESSLIKE COOPERATION BETWEEN BOTH SIDES  
AND TRIED TO AVOID SURPRISES. SOVIETS HAD GIVEN  
ADVANCE NOTICE OF THEIR NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL. IN  
CONTINUATION OF THIS POLICY, HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE  
SOVIETS ADVANCE NOTICE OF ALLIED PROPOSALS WHICH HE  
WOULD MAKE FOLLOWING DAY AS SPOKESMAN FOR  
ALLIES.

4. US REP CONTINUED THAT, STARTING WITH THEIR  
OPENING STATEMENTS, ALLIES HAD DISCUSSED THE NATURE  
OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND EXPLORED  
SOLUTIONS ALLIES PROPOSE TO ASPECTS OF THIS  
PROBLEM.

5. ALLIES WOULD ON FOLLOWING DAY PRESENT AN OUTLINE  
OF MORE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. ALLIES WERE CONVINCED  
THESE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRACTICAL AND BUSINESS-  
LIKE APPROACH OF THESE TALKS. ALLIED PROPOSALS WOULD  
INCLUDE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

A. REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN GROUND FORCES  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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B. TO ADDRESS THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE EAST  
AND WEST IN MANPOWER, THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
SHOULD BE A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER  
ON EACH SIDE. THIS MIGHT BE SET AT 7000,000 SOLDIERS  
ON EACH SIDE.

C. REDUCTIONS TO THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD  
BE NEGOTIATED IN TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES.

D. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND U.S. GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

E. TO ADDRESS THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST IN TANKS, THE USSR WOULD WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY OF FIVE DIVISIONS. THIS WOULD BE ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

F. THE U.S. WOULD ALSO WITHDRAW 15 PERCENT OF ITS TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

TO OFFSET THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY, U.S. SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

G. ASSOCIATED MEASURES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT. THEY WOULD INCLUDE:  
(I) STABILIZING MEASURES,

(II) VERIFICATION PROVISIONS,

(III) PROVISIONS TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION.

H. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING AND CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE.

6. US REP CONTINUED THAT, WITH REGARD TO PRESS HANDLING, IF ASKED, ALLIES WOULD MERELY CONFIRM HAVING MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL BUT WOULD NOT DIVULGE  
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CONTENTS. HE ADDED THAT, IN VIEW OF MUTUALLY AGREED POLICY OF CONFIDENTIALITY, ALLIES WOULD NOT CHARACTERIZE THEIR PROPOSAL OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH APPROACHES SET FORTH IN THEIR OPENING STATEMENTS, WHICH HAD BEEN PUBLISHED. SOVIET REP COMMENTED "GOOD."

7. SOVIET REP INDICATED HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO COMMENT ON ALLIED PROPOSAL BUT WANTED TO ASK A FEW CLARIFYING QUESTIONS. HE ASKED, WITH REGARD TO ALLIED OUTLINE, WHAT FORM IT WOULD TAKE -- A DRAFT AGREEMENT LIKE SOVIET PROPOSAL, SIMPLE STATEMENT OR WHAT. US REP EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD FIRST MAKE GENERAL STATEMENT AND THEN PRESENT A SEPARATE PAPER WITH ALLIED OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. SOVIET REP ASKED

ABOUT PROBLEM OF NATIONAL FORCES AND WHETHER PROPOSALS  
ENVISAGED ONLY A LOOSE COMMITMENT TO FURTHER NEGOTIA-  
TIONS. US REP REPLIED THAT FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT  
WOULD INCLUDE AN UNDERTAKING TO COMPLETE REDUCTION  
MOVEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING FOR EACH SIDE DURING  
SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IN THE SECOND PHASE WOULD INCLUDE  
REDUCTION OF NATIONAL FORCES.

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 687

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

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USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

8. SOVIET REP COMMENTED THAT HE FELT THERE WAS NOTHING  
PARTICULARLY NEW IN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. US REP  
REPLIED THAT FIGURES WERE NEW. SOVIET REP COMMENTED  
THAT HE BELIEVED THAT HE HAD SEEN THEM IN A NEWS-  
PAPER SOMEWHERE. US REP POINTED OUT THAT 68,000  
SOVIET TROOPS COMPRISE FIFTEEN PERCENT OF SOVIET

FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA, AND THAT THIS WAS PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, EQUIPMENT OF WHICH COMPRISE 1700 TANKS. SOVIET REP REPLIED WITH A SMILE THAT NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME HE KNEW HOW MANY TROOPS AND TANKS WERE IN A SOVIET TANK ARMY. SOVIET DEPREP NOTED IN CONNECTION WITH PROPOSAL FOR COMMON CEILING AT 700,000  
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MEN THAT ACCORDING TO UK REP, ALLIES HAD 777,000 MEN AND THE "OTHER FIGURE" WAS MUCH HIGHER. (COMMENT: SMIRNOVSKY WAS MAKING POINT THAT PACT REDUCTIONS UNDER ALLIED PROPOSAL WERE CONSIDERABLY LARGER, WHILE AVOIDING INDICATION THAT SOVIETS MIGHT ACCEPT ALLIED FIGURE FOR WARSAW PACT STRENGTH. END COMMENT).

9. SOVIET REP ASKED WHAT TIMING ALLIES HAD IN MIND FOR IMPLEMENTING PROPOSALS. US DEPREP ASKED IF SOVIET SIDE MEANT THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD SPECIFY DATE OF IMPLEMENTATION. NOT REPLYING DIRECTLY, SOVIET REP ASKED IF IT WERE INTENDED THAT THE PROPOSALS BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY AFTER SIGNING. US REP SAID IMPLEMENTATION WOULD PRESUMABLY START AFTER SIGNING BUT THIS WAS POINT WHICH REMAINED TO BE FIXED LATER.

10. SOVIET REP ASKED IF STORED EQUIPMENT OF WITHDRAWN US TROOPS WOULD INCLUDE RIFLES. US REP REPLIED THAT SMALL ARMS WERE NORMALLY CARRIED BY SOLDIERS WHEN TRANSFERRED AND THAT PROPOSAL REFERRED MAINLY TO HEAVY EQUIPMENT SUCH AS CANNON, TANKS, ETC, TRANSPORTATION OF WHICH BY SHIP BACK ACROSS THE ATLANTIC OCEAN WOULD BE SLOW AND DIFFICULT. SOVIET DEPREP ASKED WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO STORE EQUIPMENT IF EACH SIDE WAS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH. US DEPREP REPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE COUNSEL OF PRUDENCE IN VIEW OF GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES. BOTH SIDES WOULD BE TRYING AN EXPERIMENT.

11. SOVIET REP ASKED WHETHER SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION WOULD START ONLY AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST PHASE. US DEPREP REPLIED THAT POINT WHEN SECOND PHASE WOULD START HAD NOT YET BEEN FIXED SINCE THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO AGREE ON REDUCTIONS FIRST. ALLIES WOULD BE CONSIDERING QUESTION. SOVIET REP OBSERVED THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL THEORETICAL WAYS TO SETTLE ISSUE OF WHEN SECOND PHASE WOULD START ACCORDING TO ALLIED PROPOSAL. ONE THEORETICAL WAY MIGHT BE TO SAY SECOND PHASE WOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST. HOWEVER, SOME PARTY MIGHT SAY IT WAS NOT

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SATISFIED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST PHASE AND SECOND PHASE WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED AND MIGHT NEVER TAKE PLACE. US REP SAID IT COULD BE ASSUMED BOTH SIDES WERE ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND SECOND PHASE WOULD TAKE PLACE. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT A SECOND WAY WAS TO INCLUDE A FIXED DATE FOR SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. A THIRD WAS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS AND COVER ALL FORCES IN ONE PACKAGE.

12. KHLESTOV SAID THAT SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT TO BE IN POSITION OF AGREEING TO REDUCTION ONLY OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND ACCEPTING A MERE PROMISE TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT NATIONAL FORCES, PARTICULARLY THE BUNDESWEHR. IN THE EYES OF SOVIET PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, THE BUNDESWEHR MUST BE IN THE SAME POSITION AS THE SOVIET FORCES IF THE LATTER WERE TO BE REDUCED. THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS "UNDERSTANDABLE" TO SOVIET OPINION IN LIGHT OF THE OVERALL GLOBAL SITUATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. BUT JUST AS SOVIET FORCES CONSTITUTED FIFTY PERCENT OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES, THE BUNDESWEHR COMPRISED FIFTY PERCENT OF THE NATO FORCES IN THE AREA. MOREOVER, HE ASSERTED, BUNDESWEHR HAD OVER 500,000 MEN IN ACTIVE FORCES AND A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AND LARGE RESERVE FORCE. IF ALLIED APPROACH WERE ACCEPTED, A REDUCED SOVIET-WARSAW PACT FORCE WOULD BE LEFT TO FACE A BUNDESWEHR WHICH HAD NOT BEEN REDUCED. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE INTOLERABLE FOR SOVIET PUBLIC OPINION. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH EXCLUSION OF THE BUNDESWEHR BOTH FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL AND OTHER REASONS.

13. IN CONSLUSION, SOVIET REP COMMENTED THAT PROPOSALS OUTLINED BY THE US REP WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE LINE THUS FAR PURSUED BY THE ALLIED SIDE AND THAT HE ONLY REGRETTEED THAT THE "BIRTH" HAD TAKEN SO LONG. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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